



DNS Attacks: Can we still afford using Old, ineffective solutions?

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Goal of this presentation

■ **What is it about ?**

- More and more attacks targeting DNS
- Still very few done / invested

■ **But there are existing and solid technics !**

- To secure DNS
- Simplify the DNS administration
- Not necessarily complex to implement

Agenda

- **Stealth DNS**
- **Life without 0-Day**
- **DDoS Attacks**
- **RPZ**




Stealth DNS

Deploy a Stealth DNS Architecture

What is it ?

- Hidden Master server
- One Slave server is chosen to be the Pseudo-Master, and will be the NS configured as MNAME of the SOA
- Only the Pseudo-Master and Slaves are NS



Deploy a Stealth DNS Architecture

■ Challenges

- More complex to deploy and maintain
- No mistake can be done, otherwise the interest of using Stealth is lost!

■ Pros

- Master DNS server is not visible : improved security
- Conform to public-facing DNS best practices



Zero-Day vulnerabilities

Single DNS Engine: Strengths & Weaknesses

Disclaimer: this part is NOT about bashing BIND! :)

- **BIND is the Most Popular & Widely Deployed DNS Engine**
 - Very flexible, implements (almost) any RFC
 - De facto a “standard”

- **Security Risks**
 - Authoritative and recursive are not separated
 - Popular = targeted by attacks

- **What are you doing when a 0-day vuln is disclosed?**
 - Monitoring (even more) your DNS servers?
 - Cross your fingers until a patch is available?

Deploy several DNS engines

For instance :

ISC BIND for Authoritative DNS and Cache,
NSD (NLnet Labs) or KnotDNS (nic.cz) for Authoritative DNS,
Unbound (NLnet Labs) for Cache.

BIND

NSD

~~Unbound~~




■ Challenges:

- Several different configurations to maintain
- Several softwares to maintain / patch

■ Pros :

- Mitigate Zero-Day vulnerabilities
- Eliminate SPoF





**DDoS Attacks:
DNS servers should be
more efficient**

What can be done to face a DDoS ?


■ **Tactic #1 : filter**

- Filter : yes, but how?
 - Manually ? By using thresholds ? Heuristics ?
- Filter does not solve the problem of congestion
 - Traffic still enters the network !

■ **Tactic #2 : Absorb**


- Requires a specific architecture
- RRL (Response Rate Limit) mandatory to not be used for DDoS

2 ways to absorb



- 1) Pile up DNS servers and Load Balancers to absorb the load increase
 - => Not scalable: Individual Server Crash
 - => Deployment and management complex

How many servers/load balancers do you have to pile up to absorb 40 Gb/sec?




- 2) Deploy more efficient DNS engines/servers



RPZ

Protect Against DNS Based Malware

- DNS Firewall - or Response Policy Zone (RPZ)
 - Filters for DNS queries to malicious sites
 - Block communications with Command & Control Servers
 - Help identify infected client workstations



Policies of DNS Firewall

■ Policy Driven RPZ Rules

- REDIRECT to Walled Garden or Honeypot
- NODATA Response to DNS queries
- NXDOMAIN or Denial of Existence Response
- PASSTHRU that allows response but tracks

```
; Language-enforcement policy: no access to Wikipedia except the  
; French-speaking one  
wikipedia.org      CNAME .  
*.wikipedia.org   CNAME .  
; and the exception:  
fr.wikipedia.org  CNAME fr.wikipedia.org.
```

■ Updating Malicious Black List

- Filter by creating RRs (A, AAAA, CNAME) for each domain or IP address
- Subscription to an external feed: anti-spam, anti-phishing and anti-malware

■ Challenges

- « Lying » DNS
- Breaks DNSSEC
- Increases the load on the DNS (each request must be evaluated)

■ Pros

- More granular than using a zone with a wildcard 127.0.0.1 !
- Several policies available (NXDOMAIN, redirection, ...)

CONCLUSION

Usages and attacks will stress DNS
more and more



Change your approach
“Linux/BIND/Master-Slave!!!” :-)

QUESTIONS?



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